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I. INTRODUCTIONA S with past Survey periods, federal and state courts in Texas
have discussed the scope and application of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 and E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. Robinson2 in a variety of factual scenarios. Texas courts during this
Survey period have also continued to grapple with expert report require-
ments under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
(TCPRC), prompting one court to bemoan the "cottage industry of ex-
pert report litigation" generated by Chapter 74.3 Separately, Texas courts
continued to address issues regarding the assertion and waiver of the at-
torney-client and work-product privileges. Additional cases during this
period discuss rules relating to hearsay, relevance, and authentication.
* Mr. Zambrano is a Senior Associate with Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 284 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. 2009).
3. Philipp v. McCreedy, 298 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.).
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II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. STATE ROBINSON CASES AND RULE 702
During this Survey period, courts in Texas have addressed expert quali-
fication and reliability standards under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 and
Robinson. Among the more interesting decisions is City of San Antonio
v. Pollock.4 In Pollock, the Texas Supreme Court considered the reliabil-
ity of expert reports submitted by the plaintiffs in connection with an
allegation of harmful exposure to benzene from a nearby closed and cov-
ered landfill.5 The plaintiffs alleged that their daughter was exposed in
utero to benzene from the landfill, resulting in the development of acute
lymphoblastic leukemia diagnosed at age four.6 The leukemia resulted
from massive chromosomal anomalies in the child's bone-marrow cells.7
The plaintiffs' "home backed up to an old limestone quarry that the City
had used as a . . . landfill." 8 Prior to the lawsuit, the City of San Antonio
conducted methane tests around the landfill and determined that "pock-
ets of methane gas, . . . some in potentially explosive concentrations,"
existed near the plaintiffs' home, and this methane could have potentially
"serve[d] as a carrier for other landfill byproducts and volatile organic
compounds, such as benzene." 9 Over a period of years, the City of San
Antonio discovered that benzene had accumulated in several pockets
around the area of the plaintiffs' home, potentially as a result of seepage
from the landfill.10
In 2000, the plaintiffs' expert analyzed samples taken in 1998 from a
well that was dug seventy feet from their home and detected the presence
of methane and benzene. Using an accepted method that was not dis-
puted by the City of San Antonio, the expert concluded that, had the
samples been obtained in 1993 through 1994 when the plaintiff was preg-
nant, the concentrations of benzene would have been approximately 160
parts per billion." The expert then opined that the substance entered the
plaintiffs' home "on a regular basis." 12 A second expert-an oncolo-
gist-testified that the plaintiff's exposure to benzene leaked from the
landfill while she was pregnant caused her daughter's leukemia. Accord-
ing to the testimony, the oncologist had experience in diagnosing and
treating the type of leukemia suffered by the young girl, but he had not
personally done research on the link between her form of leukemia and
the benzene in concentrations detected by the test well.13 Moreover, the
studies reviewed by the oncologist involved concentrations of benzene of




8. Id. at 813.
9. Id. at 813-14.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 814.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 815.
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31,000 parts per billion, significantly more than the concentrations de-
tected near the plaintiffs' property by the other expert. 14
The City of San Antonio argued that the plaintiffs' experts' testimony
was conclusory; however, the City failed to object to the admission of the
testimony at trial.15 The Texas Supreme Court held that an objection was
not needed to preserve a no-evidence challenge to conclusory expert tes-
timony.16 Thus, the supreme court drew a very fine line between con-
clusory expert opinions, which do not require an objection, and
unreliable expert opinions, which do require an objection under Texas
Rule 103 to preserve error.17 The supreme court then turned to the relia-
bility challenge and concluded that the expert reports were unreliable be-
cause (1) there was no testimony linking exposure to 160 parts per billion
(as opposed to higher concentrations in other epidemiological studies)
and the development of leukemia in utero, and (2) there was no evidence
that the prevalence of benzene at the test-well site seventy feet from the
plaintiffs' home resulted in exposure in their home from "ambient air."' 8
Expressing discomfort with the majority's treatment of Texas Rule of Ev-
idence 103, the dissent by Justice Medina, joined by Justice O'Neill, ini-
tially noted that Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) required an objection
to the admission of evidence from the plaintiffs' experts.' 9 Because there
was no objection to the reliability of the expert testimony, the dissent
would have held that the objection was waived. 20 Importantly, the dis-
sent observed that any "analytical gap" in the expert testimony could
have been explained had the City of San Antonio timely objected to the
admissibility of the testimony, which would have permitted the trial court
to properly exercise its gatekeeper role.21 Finally, the dissent observed
that the expert testimony at issue was "far removed from the 'bare con-
clusions' [the supreme court] rejected as conclusory in Coastal Transpor-
tation Co. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp."2 2
The Texarkana Court of Appeals arguably applied a different standard
to waiver of objections to expert reports. In Merrell v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., the plaintiffs' son and his girlfriend died of smoke inhalation when 'a
fire destroyed their home.23 A subsequent (and apparently desultory) in-
vestigation by the fire department revealed that the fire had originated
near a recliner that was adjacent to a halogen lamp allegedly purchased at
Wal-Mart.2 4 The critical evidentiary issue in the case was whether an ex-
pert affidavit adequately linked the cause of the fire to the halogen
14. Id.
15. Id. at 816.
16. Id. at 817.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 819.
19. Id. at 822.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 826-27.
22. Id. at 828.
23. 276 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. filed).
24. Id.
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lamp.2 5 The court of appeals concluded, relying on Coastal Transporta-
tion, that Wal-Mart failed to preserve its objection to the plaintiffs' expert
report and, therefore, waived its objections.26 The viability of this deci-
sion is unclear, however, in light of the Texas Supreme Court's distinction
in Pollock between objections to conclusory reports and unreliable re-
ports. Indeed, Wal-Mart's principal objection to the report was that there
were no facts showing that the lamp was purchased at a Wal-Mart store,
and the report failed to discount other possible causes, such as cigarettes.
Such arguments might be construed as suggesting that the report was
"conclusory" and not merely "unreliable" under the Robinson factors. 27
In any event, the case illustrates the difficulties in the supreme court's
distinction between the two concepts.
Outside of the waiver context, courts have continued to wrestle with
the Robinson reliability requirements. In Hackett v. Littlepage & Booth,
the Austin Court of Appeals addressed the exclusion of an expert report
tendered by the plaintiff regarding his medical condition after he used a
drug called Celebrex. 28 The report was submitted as part of a legal mal-
practice action arising from the defendants' alleged failure to file a medi-
cal malpractice action; thus, the report was not subject to the
requirements of Chapter 74 of the TCPRC, although it did seek to estab-
lish the injury flowing from the legal malpractice. 29 The court of appeals
ultimately faulted the report for failing to establish a causal link between
Celebrex and the kidney disease affecting the plaintiff.30 For example,
the court of appeals noted that the expert testified regarding the impact
of other drugs that were in the same class of drugs as Celebrex, on the
renal condition suffered by the plaintiff.3 1 The expert, however, con-
ceded that, in his research, he did not find a case in which Celebrex was
associated with the plaintiff's kidney condition where the drug was used
for four and one-half months or less.3 2
In Lincoln v. Clark Freight Lines, Inc., the Houston First Court of Ap-
peals considered whether an accident reconstruction, in a case involving
an automobile accident, was "substantially similar" to the actual collision,
such that the report was sufficiently reliable under the Robinson stan-
dards. 3 3 The dispute did not involve the methodology used by the defen-
dant's expert (which involved the calculation of a coefficient of friction to
determine the distance that the car traveled) but, rather, the conditions
under which the accident reconstruction was performed. The general rule
25. Id. at 128.
26. Id. at 127 ("By failing to raise the issue in the trial court, Wal-Mart has failed to
preserve its complaints about the methodology for review.").
27. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 248 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. 2000).
28. No. 03-08-000560-CV, 2009 WL 416620, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 20, 2009, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
29. Id. at *7.
30. Id. at *5.
31. Id. at *5 n.8.
32. Id.
33. 285 S.W.3d 79, 86 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)
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for out-of-court experiments is that "there must be substantial similarity
between the conditions existing at the time of the experiment and the
actual event that is the subject of litigation." 34 The court of appeals said,
however, that "[tihe conditions do not need to be identical," and that the
trial court has discretion to determine whether any dissimilarities are mi-
nor or should result in exclusion. 3 5
In Lincoln, the plaintiffs argued that the test was too dissimilar be-
cause, among other things, (1) the reconstruction involved a "different
year, make, and model vehicle," (2) the test vehicle was an automatic
rather than a manual-transmission vehicle, (3) the test vehicle used to
perform skid and speed calculations was "a police 'interceptor' Camaro
with a substantially more powerful engine," (4) the test vehicle had a dif-
ferent braking system, and (5) the expert did not test the hardness of the
tires in the test vehicle and the damaged vehicle but instead relied on a
subjective view of the tires.36 Despite what appear on the surface to be
significant differences in the vehicle used for the reconstruction, the court
of appeals held that these dissimilarities did not affect the reliability of
the expert report. 37 The court of appeals noted that the expert was able
to explain away the dissimilarities by stating that the coefficient-of-fric-
tion calculation was not impacted by differences in the vehicles.38 More-
over, although the expert did not test the hardness of the tires, the court
of appeals held that his subjective evaluation of the tires, based on his
experience as an accident reconstruction expert, was sufficient to show
that the tires in the test vehicle and accident vehicle had a similar
consistency.39
B. EXPERT REPORTS AND AFFIDAVITS UNDER CHAPTER 74
A related line of cases deals with the application of Robinson standards
under Chapter 74 of the TCPRC, which generally governs the submission
of expert reports in the context of medical malpractice actions. During
the Survey period, the dominant theme in cases discussing expert require-
ments under Chapter 74 was the requirement in Gammill v. Jack Williams
Chevrolet, Inc. that the expert report not have an "analytical gap" be-
tween the data relied on by the expert and the expert's ultimate conclu-
sions.40 In the context of medical malpractice claims governed by
34. Id. at 84 (quoting Fort Worth & Denver Ry. Co. v. Williams, 375 S.W.2d 279, 281-
82 (Tex. 1964)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 87, 89.
37. Id. at 89.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 91.
40. 972 S.W.2d 713, 727 (Tex. 1998) ("The 'analytical gap' between the data in this
case and Huston's opinion was not shown to be due to his techniques in assessing the
vehicle restraint system . . . . Rather, the 'gap' in Huston's analysis was his failure to show
how his observations, assuming they were valid, supported his conclusions that Jaime was
wearing her seat belt or that it was defective. The district court was not required, in
Joiner's words, 'to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the
ipse dixit of the expert.'").
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Chapter 74, this issue typically arises when courts wrestle with whether
causation has been adequately addressed by the expert. The opinions be-
low also discuss whether the expert is sufficiently qualified under Texas
Rule of Evidence 702. Typically, defendants objecting to expert reports
proffered in these cases attempt to distinguish between generally applica-
ble medical knowledge or expertise and the specific area of expertise that
the defendant possesses, with mixed results.
In St. Clair v. Alexander, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals dis-
cussed arguments by the plaintiff that the trial court abused its discretion
by excluding expert testimony in support of her claim.41 The defendant's
expert-Matthew T. Alexander-had testified that the plaintiff's ex-
pert-J. Martin Barrash-"was unqualified to offer standard-of-care tes-
timony" because he was no longer a lead surgeon who performed the
types of spinal procedures at issue. Rather, he characterized Barrash as
just a "second opinion" doctor.42 The court of appeals discounted this
testimony, observing that although Barrash did not hold the title of "lead
surgeon," he nevertheless continued to participate and assist in
laminectomies and was therefore qualified under chapter 74 of the
TCPRC.4 3 Alexander also challenged the reliability of Barrash's testi-
mony, which required the court of appeals to look at the factors for relia-
bility of expert testimony in Robinson and the Gammill "analytical gap"
analysis. Alexander testified that Barrash's expert analysis was not relia-
ble because it was not based on medical records, was not supported by
medical literature, and did not discount alternative causes of the injury.44
The court of appeals, however, disagreed, noting that Barrash's expert
report was based on a well-accepted methodology known as "differential
diagnosis," by which a doctor identifies the cause of a medical problem by
eliminating possible causes through an analysis of patient history, doing
physical examinations, and comparing symptoms to those of known dis-
eases.45 Moreover, the court of appeals noted that the expert stated in
his report that he had reviewed the postoperative radiographic studies of
the plaintiff as well as her medical records. 46 Finally, the expert suffi-
ciently addressed and discounted alternative explanations.47 The princi-
pal impact of St. Clair is in its suggestion that an expert may be
sufficiently qualified by being actively involved with the medical proce-
dures at issue, even if the expert does not play a lead role in such
procedures.
41. No. 13-08-00218-CV, 2009 WL 3135812, *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Sept. 30,
2009, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
42. Id. at *2-3.
43. Id. at *3 (distinguishing Larson v. Downing, 197 S.W.3d 303, 305 (Tex. 2006), in
which the Texas Supreme Court concluded that an expert was properly excluded where the
expert had not performed the surgery at issue for more than 11 years).
44. Id. at *4-5.





Granbury Minor Emergency Clinic v. Thiel continues this line of rea-
soning by focusing on the extent of knowledge and experience of the phy-
sician proffering an expert report, even if the physician practices in a
different area of medicine. 48 In Thiel, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
addressed a challenge to an expert report filed pursuant to Chapter 74 of
the TCPRC. The defendant argued that (1) the expert was not qualified,
and (2) the "report fail[ed] to adequately set forth the statutory expert
report elements of standard of care, breach and causation.49 The court of
appeals began its discussion by summarizing the requirements of an ex-
pert report under Chapter 74. Section 74.351 sets forth the procedural
requirements for submitting an expert report in a medical malpractice
claim.50 An expert report must be dismissed if it does not represent an
"objective good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert
report," which is further defined to mean a written report that contains "a
fair summary of the expert's opinions ... as to the applicable standards of
care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health
care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship
between the failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed." 5' Addi-
tionally, "[t]o constitute a good faith effort, the report must 'discuss the
standard of care, breach, and causation with sufficient specificity to in-
form the defendant of the conduct the plaintiff has called into question
and to provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have
merit.'"52
The court of appeals first addressed whether the plaintiff's expert-Dr.
Spangler-was qualified to provide opinions in the case, in light of the
fact that he was a board-certified emergency room physician, whereas the
defendant doctor was a general family practitioner.53 The Texas Rules of
Evidence provide that a witness may be qualified as an expert by "knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education." 54 Reviewing Dr. Span-
gler's curriculum vitae, the court of appeals concluded that Dr. Spangler
was sufficiently qualified because he was "licensed to practice medicine in
the State of Texas and was practicing medicine at the time [the plaintiff's]
claim arose"; during his career as an emergency room physician, he knew
the standards of care with respect to the treatment of abdominal disor-
ders, including the appendicitis suffered by the plaintiff, and he was
"board certified in emergency medicine and ha[d] practiced for over
twenty years."55 Interestingly, the court of appeals discounted the fact
that Dr. Spangler had a different medical specialty than the defendant,
48. 296 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 265; see TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
51. Thiel, 296 S.W.3d at 265 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351(1),
(r)(6)).
52. Id. (quoting Am. Transitional Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex.
2001)).
53. Id.
54. TEX. R. EvID. 702.
55. Thiel, 296 S.W.3d at 267-68.
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citing other court decisions for the proposition that "the statute does not
require a medical expert be practicing in the exact same field as the de-
fendant physician, but instead must only be actively practicing medicine
in rendering medical care services relevant to the claim."56
At first blush, this decision would seem to run counter to the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Broders v. Heise, in which the supreme court
rejected an argument that a medical doctor was able to testify about "all
medical matters."57 Indeed, the supreme court explained further that
"given the increasingly specialized and technical nature of medicine,
there is no validity, if there ever was, to the notion that every licensed
medical doctor should be automatically qualified to testify as an expert on
every medical question."58 Thiel can be read consistently with Broders,
however, in that an expert may have a different specialty and still be able
to testify if the expert has other knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education that exists in the four corners of the expert report. In other
words, the expert in Thiel was not "automatically" qualified by virtue of
being a doctor in an unrelated specialty, but was qualified in other ways.
With respect to the reliability of the report, the Thiel court concluded
that the expert report adequately set forth the standard of care and pro-
vided sufficient information linking the defendant's purported breach of
the standard of care to the plaintiff's injury.59 For example, the court of
appeals noted with respect to the standard of care allegations that Dr.
Spangler set forth two standard-of-care violations: (1) failure "to conduct
an appropriate and thorough history and physical examination" of the
plaintiff, and (2) failure "to refer [the plaintiff] to the hospital emergency
department or to a surgeon to treat her appendicitis." 6 0 Dr. Spangler's
report also identified a number of different diagnostic tests that would
have been conducted under the appropriate standard of care.61 Likewise,
the court of appeals noted that the expert report properly set forth causa-
tion by linking the defendant's failure "to conduct any meaningful work-
up to determine the cause of [the plaintiff's] abdominal pain" to a
delayed diagnosis of appendicitis that resulted in the plaintiff's injuries. 62
Other courts agree with the conclusion in Thiel that an expert may be
qualified to render an opinion even if he or she is not in the same medical
specialty as the defendant. In Estorque v. Schafer, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals again visited the issue of expert qualification under Rule 702
and appeared to announce a somewhat broader rule: "When a party can
show that a subject is substantially developed in more than one field, tes-
56. Id. (citing Kelly v. Rendon, 255 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, no pet.)).
57. 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. 1996).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Thiel, 296 S.W.3d at 273-74.
60. Id. at 270.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 272.
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timony can come from an expert in any of those fields." 63 In Estorque,
the defendant physicians argued that the plaintiff's expert was not quali-
fied "in the specialties of nephrology, urology and gynecology to render
opinions" regarding kidney disorders and gynecological cysts.64 The
court of appeals disagreed and reiterated that "a physician does not need
to be a, practitioner in the same specialty as the defendant physician to
qualify as an expert."65 Rather, the appropriate inquiry is the expert's
"familiarity with the issues involved in the claim before the court." 66 Ap-
plying these standards, the court of appeals concluded that the expert, a
board certified family physician, was qualified by virtue of his training,
education, and experience treating patients with similar conditions.67
Unlike in Thiel, however, the expert report in Estorque was unreliable
because the report contained analytical gaps. Specifically, the report did
not explain how the defendants' failure to consult a urologist or gynecolo-
gist (the applicable standard of care suggested by the expert) worsened
the plaintiff's condition.68 Similarly, the plaintiff's expert failed to clarify
how the injuries would have been avoided had the defendants consulted
with a urologist or gynecologist earlier in the course of treatment. 69
In Philipp v. McCreedy, the San Antonio Court of Appeals also dis-
cussed expert qualifications under Chapter 74 and Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 702.70 The case involved an argument by the defendant doctor
that, although the plaintiff's expert was qualified to address the standard
of care for emergency room treatment, he was not qualified to render
opinions regarding complications arising after the plaintiff was seen by an
orthopedic surgeon and later suffered injuries stemming from a post-op-
erative ankle fracture.71 The court of appeals disagreed and noted that,
although the plaintiff's expert's curriculum vitae did "not reflect any spe-
cific orthopedic training or experience," his report did include statements
regarding his familiarity with the type of treatment and injury at issue.72
C. WAIVER UNDER CHAPTER 74
During the Survey period, one interesting case addressed whether
there was a waiver of the ability to seek a dismissal of a defective expert
report under Chapter 74 of the TCPRC.73 In Seifert v. Price, the Dallas
Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendants waived their right to
seek the dismissal of an untimely filed expert report by waiting over two
63. 302 S.W.3d 19, 26 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
64. Id. at 26-27.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 27.
68. Id. at 28-29.
69. Id. at 29.
70. 298 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.).
71. Id. at 687.
72. Id. at 688.
73. Seifert v. Price, No. 05-08-00655-CV, 2008 WL 5341045, *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Dec. 23, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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years to seek relief.74 Under section 74.352(a), a plaintiff has 120 days
after filing a claim "to serve providers with an expert report and curricu-
lum vitae."75 In Seifert, the plaintiff filed the required report roughly
three months after the statutory deadline.76 Nevertheless, the defendants
did not attempt to dismiss the expert report until after conducting discov-
ery, filing special exceptions, depositing five of nine witnesses (including
the challenged expert) and filing many dispositive motions.77 Despite the
defendants' conduct, the court of appeals held as a matter of law that
their conduct did not constitute an intentional relinquishment of the right
to seek dismissal based on a late-filed Chapter 74 expert report.78 The
court of appeals fell short of explaining at what point the defendants'
conduct would constitute a waiver under these circumstances, but the
opinion suggests in dicta that waiver is possible in some circumstances-
for example, after a jury trial or appeal.79
D. FEDERAL DAUBERT CASES
Federal courts in Texas issued several opinions during the Survey pe-
riod regarding Daubert and challenges to experts. Because these opin-
ions provide some persuasive guidance in the application of Texas Rule
702, they are included in this article. In Advanced Technology Incubator,
Inc. v. Sharp Corp., the Eastern District of Texas considered a Daubert
challenge to an expert report regarding U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice procedures.80 The defendants argued that the report should be
struck because, among other things, it included improper legal opinions
on patent law, and the opinions on patent office procedures were "irrele-
vant and unnecessary."81 The court concluded that the majority of the
report's opinion on legal issues would not assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence and therefore was properly excluded under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.82 However, the opinions regarding the duty of
good faith and fair dealing to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office were
admissible.83
Some cases decided during the Survey period illustrate how the crea-
tive use of expert testimony can fail when the most basic requirements of
Daubert are not met. In Villegas v. City of Freeport, the Southern District
of Texas considered the remarkable claim that the failure of the city to
74. Id.
75. Id. at *2 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE Arm. § 74.351(a) (Vernon Supp.
2008)).
76. Id. at *1.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *2-3 ("Attempting to learn more about the case through discovery does not
demonstrate an intent to waive the right to dismiss, nor does the filing of motions for
summary judgment on other grounds.") (citing Jernigan v. Langley, 111 S.W.3d 153, 157
(Tex. 2003)).
79. Id. at *3.
80. No. 2:07-CV-468, 2009 WL 4668790, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2009).
81. Id.
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id.
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train city law enforcement on how to treat a person with "excited delir-
ium" resulted in a constitutional civil-rights violation.8 In a footnote, the
court opined that it was "highly unlikely" that an expert report regarding
"excited delirium" would be admissible under Daubert.8 5 Among other
things, the expert had no medical training and only attended a one-week
training class on "excited delirium" eight years before.86 Moreover, his
opinions were not subjected to peer review and were not "supported by a
general consensus in the relevant scientific or professional communi-
ties."87 This result was predictable given the highly unusual nature of the
expert testimony at issue.
Other cases, however, involved closer calls. In Bro-Tech Corp. v. Pu-
rity Water Co. of San Antonio, the Western District of Texas granted a
motion to exclude an expert report on the basis that the report only pos-
ited "theories" about a manufacturing process that resulted in a defect in
biodiesel fuel.88 The defendants opposing the admission of the report
argued that the expert "fails to ascribe a cause or conclusion as to which
if any of the ascribed theoretical bases that could cause resin failure had
in fact occurred, or whether the resin itself was defective." 89 The court
agreed, holding that the report should be excluded because the expert did
not opine as to which particular cause of the defect in the biodiesel resin
was more likely.90 The court also took issue with the fact that the expert
had qualified his report by stating that additional information and labora-
tory testing were needed to draw such conclusions.91 Citing the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Burleson v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the district court
concluded that expert testimony is speculative and inherently unreliable
when it "fails to show that a potential cause is more or less probable." 9 2
The Southern District of Texas reached a somewhat consistent result
regarding "speculative" opinions. Schoenmann Produce Co. v. BNSF
Railway Co. dealt with the loss of thirty-three shipments of potatoes
when the refrigeration units on the BNSF railcars stopped functioning.93
The court considered an argument in a Daubert motion that the plaintiff's
expert's report was unreliable because (1) it failed to link opinions re-
garding possible causes of the breakdown of refrigeration to the specific
railcars that had an issue, (2) the expert was not an expert on potato
physiology or the shipment of bulk potatoes, and (3) the expert's opin-
ions were potentially misleading to the jury.94 The court discounted the
84. No. G-08-0151, 2009 WL 2567900 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2009).
85. Id. at *4 n.3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. No. SA-08-CV-0594-XR, 2009 WL 1748539, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 19, 2009).
89. Id.
90. Id. at *8.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing Burleson v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 587 (5th Cir.
2004)).
93. No. H-07-1776, 2009 WL 1546081, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2009).
94. Id. at *2.
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attack on the expert's qualifications, noting that he had "thirty years of
experience in the handling, storage, and transportation of perishable
products, including potatoes." 95 The court also permitted the expert to
testify about his general knowledge regarding the operation of railway
cars and the handling of bulk potatoes.96 The court concluded, however,
that the report was not sufficiently reliable to the extent that the expert
testified that certain conditions caused problems in specific railway cars-
for example, mud on the railway car floors or short cycling caused by
improper loading of the product.97 While Schoenmann Produce and Bro-
Tech both illustrate that speculative opinions are not appropriate under
Daubert, the Schoenmann Produce court expressed a greater willingness
to allow the expert to offer general testimony about possible conditions
that could have an effect.
Finally, one court addressed the issue of waiver under Federal Rule
103. In Perdue v. Nissan Motor Co.,98 the defendant challenged the ad-
mission of expert testimony under Daubert; however, the defendant
failed to specifically identify the challenged evidence and did not object
at trial.99 In marked contrast to the Texas Supreme Court's perspective
on Texas Rule of Evidence 103 regarding preservation of objections, the
Eastern District of Texas concluded that the defendant's objections in
Perdue were waived under the equivalent Federal Rule of Evidence 103,
which provides that error is preserved with a timely objection that states
on the record the specific grounds of the objection. 100
III. PRIVILEGES
A. ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
There have been a number of cases during the Survey period address-
ing the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.
This article summarizes one of those cases involving a more exhaustive
treatment of these two issues. In In re Small, the El Paso Court of Ap-
peals considered the assertion of attorney-client privilege and attorney
work product in the context of an oil-and-gas-lease dispute.' 01 The rela-
tors-Joe Small and Enerplus Resources (USA) Corporation (Ener-
plus)-filed a mandamus action to vacate a trial court order compelling
the production of numerous documents that the relators asserted were




98. No. 2:07CV546, 2009 WL 2460988 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009).
99. Id. at *2.
100. Cf with City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009) ("Bare,
baseless opinions will not support a judgment even if there is no objection to their admis-
sion in evidence.").




munications which are intended to be confidential between the attorney
and the client and which are made for the purpose of facilitating the ren-
dition of legal services for the client." 103 Furthermore, "a communication
is 'confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than
those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of pro-
fessional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication."104
The discovery dispute over privileged material centered on five groups
of documents listed on a privilege log: (1) emails between Enerplus rep-
resentatives and an attorney, John Lee (Group "A"), (2) a fax document
sent in May 2006 from an Enerplus landman (in this case, a third party
retained to assist Mr. Small and Mr. Lee with respect to title issues) to an
Enerplus land manager (Group "B"), (3) handwritten notes by an Ener-
plus vice president regarding discussions he had with attorney Lee
(Group "C"), (4) a single document referred to as a "due diligence re-
port," which was created by Enerplus attorneys for Enerplus employee
review (Group "D"), and (5) several emails sent from attorney Lee to
Enerplus representatives concerning royalties from a well (Group
"E").105 With respect to Groups "A" and "C," the real party in interest,
S.L.D.S. Energy, Inc. (S.L.D.S.), argued that the documents in these
groups were not privileged, because they were prepared at a time when
the attorney was not providing legal services, and thus the privilege was
waived. 106 The court of appeals disagreed that the documents at issue
were prepared while the attorney was not providing legal services, point-
ing to contrary evidence in the record. 107 More importantly, the court of
appeals held that privilege was not waived with respect to communica-
tions between the third-party landman and Enerplus and its counsel be-
cause (1) the third party "understood that his communications . . .
regarding the title work [were] confidential," and (2) the emails and other
disclosures were made in the furtherance of the attorney's representation
of Enerplus.108
Regarding the Group "E" emails, S.L.D.S. argued that any privilege
was waived as a result of the fact that the emails were disclosed to third
parties and that one of the recipients of the email "reviewed the docu-
ment while preparing to testify."109 The court of appeals disagreed, reit-
erating its conclusion that a privileged "communication is 'confidential' if
it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those persons
to whom disclosure is made 'in furtherance of the rendition of profes-
sional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
103. Id. at *3 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)).
104. Id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(5)).
105. Id. at *1.
106. Id. at *3.
107. Id. at *4.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *5.
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transmission of the communication."' "110 In this case, copies of the emails
were sent to an Enerplus executive and third parties associated with Lyco
Gas-the third-party entity which contracted with Enerplus to provide a
professional landman in furtherance of the rendition of legal services.
Thus, the court of appeals determined "there was no waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege" by virtue of emails sent to these individuals. 1 ' Fur-
ther, the court of appeals disagreed that the privilege was waived as a
result of the fact that one of the witnesses used the document to prepare
for a deposition.112 The court of appeals avoided the issue of whether
Texas Rule of Evidence 612(2) applied, which would have required the
production of documents used to refresh memory prior to testifying, and
instead focused on evidence in the record showing that the witness re-
viewed only documents that referred to the emails and not the emails
themselves.113 Nevertheless, this portion of the court's opinion highlights
the risks associated with using otherwise privileged documents in witness
preparation.
With respect to the Group "D" documents, in particular, and several of
the other categories of documents, S.L.D.S. asserted that they were dis-
coverable under the "crime-fraud exception" of Rule 503.114 Group "D"
included a due diligence review by attorneys at Andrews & Kurth, L.L.P.,
in conjunction with a merger between Enerplus and Lyco Energy Corpo-
ration.11 5 Under Texas Rule of Evidence 503(d)(1), material that is "oth-
erwise protected by the attorney-client privilege is discoverable 'if the
services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to
commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should
have known to be a crime or fraud."11 6 Moreover, "mere allegations of
fraud are not sufficient [and the] fraud alleged to have occurred must
have happened at or during the time the document was prepared, and the
document must have been created as part of perpetrating the fraud."" 7
Applying these rules, the court of appeals disagreed that the crime-fraud
exception was satisfied because (1) the fact that S.L.D.S. alleged fraud in
its lawsuit was not sufficient to establish that the documents themselves
constituted or reflected fraudulent conduct, (2) S.L.D.S.'s "blanket asser-
tion" that the documents would establish the existence of fraud in ob-
taining the attorney's services was insufficient, and (3) S.L.D.S. failed to
establish a connection between the particular documents sought and the
fraud alleged."18




114. Id. at *6.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 503(d)(1)).
117. Id. at *6 (citing In re Siegel, 198 S.W.3d 21, 28-29 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, orig.
proceeding [mand. denied])).
118. Id. at *7.
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Finally, the court of appeals addressed the assertion of attorney work
product on the Group "B" document, which consisted of a fax from the
third-party landman to an Enerplus land manager "created as part of a
series of communications related to his investigation of [the real party in
interest's] claim that he was fraudulently induced to sign [a] release." 9
Generally, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5(b)(2) "precludes discov-
ery of an attorney's work product." 120 Work product is defined as "mate-
rial prepared or mental impressions developed in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for a party or a party's representatives, including the
party's attorneys, consultants, sureties, and indemnitors, insurers, em-
ployees, or agents." 121 Work product is also defined as "a communication
made in anticipation of litigation or for trial between a party and the
party's representatives or among a party's representatives, including the
party's attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees
or agents."122 Core work product is material "that contains the mental
impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories" of the attorney or
the attorney's representative.12 3 All other work product is non-core work
product.124 The work product doctrine "extends both to documents actu-
ally created by the attorney and memoranda, reports, notes, or summa-
ries of interviews prepared by other individuals for the attorney's use."125
In In re Small, S.L.D.S. did not dispute the categorization of Group
"B" documents as non-core work product but argued instead that it was
entitled to discovery of the documents based on "substantial need."126
The court of appeals noted that "[a] party does not establish a 'substantial
need' for materials by showing a 'substantial desire' for them."127 The
court of appeals concluded that S.L.D.S. failed to meet its burden of
showing substantial need and undue hardship, because it merely stated
conclusorily that "[i]nformation in the May 2006 fax may evidence the
fraudulent scheme concocted and pursued by Enerplus to obtain the re-
lease."1 28 According to the court of appeals, this argument only demon-
strated S.L.D.S.'s "desire" to obtain the document-not a substantial
need for the document. 29
B. WAIVER
In In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, the Beaumont Court
of Appeals addressed the interplay between Texas Rule of Evidence
511-waiver of privilege by voluntary disclosure-and Texas Rule of
119. Id. at *8.
120. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(b)(2)).
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(a)(1).
122. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(a)(2).
123. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(b)(1).
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(b)(2).
125. In re Small, 2009 WL 1620436, at *8.






Civil Procedure 193.3(d), the "snap-back provision."130 This original pro-
ceeding involved the inadvertent production of documents by the under-
writers to insurance policyholders that was discovered a significant period
of time after the production. 31 The privileged material was encompassed
in handwritten notes by an employee of a third-party adjusting company
hired by the underwriters to perform an insurance investigation; the notes
reflected extensive discussions between and among employees of the
third-party adjuster, the underwriters, and counsel.132 Regarding the spe-
cific issue of waiver, the policyholder argued that Texas Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 193.3(d) was, by its terms, limited to "parties" to the lawsuit.133
Rule 193.3(d) provides:
A party who produces material or information without intending to
waive a claim of privilege does not waive that claim under these rules
or the Rules of Evidence if-within ten days or a shorter time or-
dered by the court, after the producing party actually discovers that
such production was made-the producing party amends the re-
sponse, identifying the material or information produced and stating
the privilege asserted. If the producing party thus amends the re-
sponse to assert a privilege, the requesting party must promptly re-
turn the specified material or information and any copies pending
any ruling by the court denying the privilege.134
In this case, the policyholders argue, the documents containing the privi-
leged material were produced by the third-party adjuster-not a party to
the dispute-and therefore the inadvertent disclosure was governed by
Texas Rule of Evidence 511 regarding the waiver of privilege. 135 The
court of appeals disagreed that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d)
could be construed narrowly. 36 For example, the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence governing privileged material indicate that "the right to assert a
privilege is not generally dependent upon physical possession of a docu-
ment."' 37 Moreover, a restrictive reading of Rule 193.3(d) would "effec-
tively negate the privilege holder's enforcement rights when nonparties to
the suit produce privileged information"; this is problematic when the
rules permit the sharing of such privileged material with non-parties
under certain circumstances.13 8 Finally, the court of appeals noted that
privileges like the work-product privilege are defined to extend beyond
documents physically in a party's possession.139 While this reasoning
seems to be consistent with the principles behind the Texas Rules of Civil
130. In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 294 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2009, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
131. Id. at 896-97.
132. Id. at 895-96.
133. Id. at 901.
134. Id. (emphasis added) (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d)).
135. Id. at 901-02.
136. Id. at 902.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 903.
139. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(a)(1)).
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Procedure, a related case decided by the Houston Fourteenth Court of
Appeals in May 2008 reached the opposite conclusion and held that Rule
193.3(d) could not be used to remedy the production of privileged patient
records by a non-party to the suit.140
IV. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS OF NOTE
A. AUTHENTICATION
This Survey period saw several cases addressing the issue of authentica-
tion of evidence under the Texas Rules of Evidence. In Lyons v. Lyons,
the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered whether business records
accompanying a business-records affidavit were properly excluded under
Texas Rule of Evidence 902(10) (authentication of business records) on
the basis that the underlying business-records affidavit did not substan-
tially comply with a sample affidavit under Texas Rule of Evidence
902(10)(b).141 Texas Rule of Evidence 902(10)(a) provides that any doc-
uments that would qualify as business records under Texas Rules of Evi-
dence 803(6) and (7) are admissible as long as the custodian of records
files a proper affidavit at least fourteen days prior to trial.142 Texas Rule
of Evidence 902(10)(b) attaches a form affidavit consistent with the rules
and states further that an affidavit is sufficient if it "substantially com-
plies" with the form. 1 4 3 In Lyons, the court of appeals held that the busi-
ness-records affidavit "failed to substantially comply with the form,"
because it was not properly notarized.1 4 4 This case shows that even a
good-faith attempt to "substantially comply" may be insufficient. Coun-
sel should consider simply using the form in the rules to avoid uncertain-
ties of the "substantial compliance" test.
In Nixon v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., the Dallas Court of Appeals ad-
dressed an issue regarding Texas Rule 901(b)(7) (authentication of public
records). 1 4 5 In a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evi-
dence, the plaintiff attempted to offer an IRS record and an unsworn
statement alleging that he received the record in the mail.1 4 6 The Texas
Rule of Evidence 901(b)(7) provides that "a public record [may] be au-
thenticated by evidence that the document is 'from a public office where
items of this nature are kept."1 47 The Nixon court concluded that Rule
901(b)(7) was "not a rule of self-authentication"; rather, additional ex-
trinsic evidence was needed to establish that the purported IRS docu-
140. See In re Ortuno, No. 14-08-00227-CV, 2008 WL 2339800, at *2 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] May 6, 2008, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
141. No. 04-08-00259-CV, 2009 WL 89728, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 14,
2009, pet. denied).
142. TEX. R. EVID. 902(10)(a).
143. TEX. R. EVID. 902(10)(b).
144. Lyons, 2009 WL 89728, at *2.
145. No. 05-08-00256-CV, 2009 WL 2973660, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 18, 2009,
no pet.).
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(7)).
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ment did in fact come from the IRS.148
B. HEARSAY
The only case identified during the Survey period addressing the Texas
Rules of Evidence on hearsay focused on the business-records exception
to the hearsay rule-Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6). In Cano v. Nino's
Paint & Body Shop, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals, ad-
dressed an argument by Cano that the district court improperly admitted
under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule five documents
submitted by Nino summarizing invoices and labor and materials costs. 1 4 9
Cano specifically argued that Nino failed to establish that the five docu-
ments were "(1) made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity; (2) made at or near the time of the event that they re-
corded; and (3) reliable and trustworthy."1 5 0 The crux of Cano's com-
plaint was that the exhibits were "summaries of business records," rather
than the business records themselves, and that the exhibits "were com-
piled two days after Cano filed suit" and not at the time of the events.15
The court of appeals disagreed, noting that even summaries of underlying
labor and materials records for work performed could be business-
records, provided that an affidavit is submitted establishing the business
records exception. 152 In this case,
Nino testified that (1) the exhibit was maintained in the regular and
ordinary course of business; (2) the exhibit was kept in the course of
regularly conducted business activity; (3) the exhibit was completed
or created at the time at which the events contained within it were
occurring; and (4) he had personal knowledge of the facts contained
within the document.153
The fact that one of the exhibits was a compilation of events that oc-
curred over a period of time did not faze the court.154
C. RELEVANCE (RULES 401 AND 403)
In Coastal Oil v. Garza Energy Trust, the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed at length the rule of capture in a royalty and trespass dispute
involving the use of subsurface hydraulic fracturing on property adjacent
to that of the plaintiffs', resulting in drainage of gas.' 55 Of importance to
this Article, however, is an animated discussion regarding the plaintiff
148. Id.
149. No. 14-08-00033-CV, 2009 WL 1057622, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Apr. 16, 2009, no pet.).
150. Id. at *5.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *5-6 (citing McAllen State Bank v. Linbeck Constr. Corp., 695 S.W.2d 10
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.); Curran v. Unis, 711 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, no writ)).
153. Id. at *6.
154. Id.
155. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
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landowners' use of an internal memorandum by Coastal Oil that referred
to the owners of the tracts affected by the alleged trespass as "illiterate
Mexicans."1 56 Pursuant to Texas Rule 403, Coastal Oil argued that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the internal
memorandum, which also contained a title opinion and a discussion re-
garding the uncertainties in establishing the owners' respective interests
in the property. 57 Coastal Oil argued that the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
because (1) the evidence was used "to inflame the all-Hispanic jury," (2)
the evidence resulted in damage findings against Coastal in excess of the
claims, and (3) the evidence resulted in a $10 million punitive-damage
award.158
Justice Hecht's opinion focused largely on the probative value of the
memorandum, and he noted that none of the title issues in the memoran-
dum were involved in the dispute over the trespass caused by the hydrau-
lic fracturing.'59 Moreover, at the time the memorandum was written,
there was no dispute between the plaintiffs and the adjacent landowners
regarding the boundary of their properties. On the contrary, the internal
memorandum recommended drilling on the land owned by the plaintiffs,
and a subsequent royalty dispute was resolved by agreed judgment that
disposed of all issues regarding the royalties generated by the well drilled
by Coastal Oil at that time.160 Subsequent to the memorandum, how-
ever, a separate boundary dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the
adjacent property holders that arguably influenced Coastal Oil's decision
to drill on the adjacent land. The "long-since-resolved title problems"
referenced in the earlier memorandum, however, had no probative value
with respect to the later dispute.161 Balanced against this lack of proba-
tive value was the clear danger of unfair prejudice from the phrase "illit-
erate Mexicans," which "could be read as derogatory and not merely an
unfortunate phrase included in describing the failure to maintain a clear
record of title."162 Whether or not the phrase was indeed a mere "unfor-
tunate phrase" is, of course, a conclusion fraught with uncertainty, and
counsel for Coastal Oil spent considerable time attempting to downplay
the phrase. But what is certain is that the plaintiffs' counsel was able to
solicit testimony from one of the plaintiffs that he "[felt] infuriated, in-
sulted because [his] ancestors were-are insulted in this memo, and it
[made him] really, really mad."163 This testimony raised the specter of
unfair prejudice, because, as Justice Hecht noted, there were no other
questions to the witness regarding title problems or development de-
156. Id. at 21-22.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 22.
160. Id.
161. Id.




lays-ostensibly the reason why the memorandum was offered into
evidence.164
Justice Johnson wrote a separate concurrence that highlighted the prej-
udicial nature of the memorandum. He agreed that the memorandum's
admission was erroneous and harmful; however, he indicated that a harm
analysis was not necessary with respect to the memorandum because its
admission was an incurable error.165 He noted that the unfair prejudice
associated with the memorandum was enhanced by the fact that plain-
tiffs' counsel repeatedly emphasized the memorandum and did not refer
to it without also mentioning the derogatory phrase.'6 In strong lan-
guage, Justice Johnson stated:
The memorandum was intended to and did inject racial prejudice
into the trial. The question we are bound to address related to our
system of justice is how to best minimize the number of cases that
appear to be or are tried under the cloud of mistrust that admission
of this type of evidence engenders.167
Justice Johnson emphasized that "it is not acceptable advocacy to inflame
the jury with irrelevant evidence of or reference to such 'hot-button' mat-
ters as sex, race, ethnicity, nationality or religion."1 68 Thus, he would
have held that harm was presumed under such circumstances and incur-
able. Justice Johnson's concurrence illustrates the care with which "hot-
button" evidence should be offered, if at all. The problem with the evi-
dence submitted in Coastal Oil was that the plaintiffs failed to link the
derogatory comment to any evidence that was probative of the issues at
hand. But if, for example, additional evidence showed that the defend-
ants did in fact conceal a discriminatory view of the plaintiffs that re-
sulted in its decision to drill on an adjacent property, it is possible that the
burden-prejudice equation of Texas Rule of Evidence 403 might have
had a different result.
D. PROPERTY OWNER RULE
The "Property Owner Rule" is an interesting twist on the rules gov-
erning witness testimony, including opinion testimony of lay witnesses
under Texas Rule of Evidence 601. Under the Property Owner Rule, "a
property owner who is familiar with the market value of his or her prop-
erty may testify regarding that market value, even if he is not qualified or
designated as an expert witness" under Texas Rule of Evidence 702.169 In
Speedy Stop, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals, discussed this
rule in the context of corporate property owners, addressing a growing
164. Id.
165. Id. at 42.
166. Id. at 48.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd. v. Reid Rd. Mun. Util. Dist., 282 S.W.3d 652, 653
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. granted).
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split in the courts of appeals.170 At issue in the case was a decision by the
district court to grant a no-evidence summary judgment motion in a con-
demnation case despite the fact that the business owner of Speedy Stop-
a lay witness-gave testimony regarding the value of the property rights
being condemned.17' Over a dissent by Judge Seymore, the majority con-
cluded that "the Property Owner Rule applies to corporate entities own-
ing property and [a corporate representative] familiar with the fair
market value of the property may testify ... as to the market value of the
property without being designated as an expert witness."1 72 The court of
appeals reasoned that, much like individual owners, corporate property
owners "ordinarily know the market value of their property and there-
fore have a sound basis for testifying as to its value."' 7 3 The dissent, on
the other hand, argued that the "Property Owner Rule is predicated en-
tirely on ownership," and, because a corporation cannot testify except
through an agent or an employee who is not the "owner," the Property
Owner Rule did not apply.174 In light of an apparent split in the decisions
of the courts of appeals, the lack of Texas Supreme Court authority, and
the existence of a dissent, it is possible that the supreme court might con-
sider granting review of the case.
V. CONCLUSION
While these cases represent a mixed bag of rulings regarding eviden-
tiary issues, they do illustrate the care and attention with which such is-
sues are resolved in Texas courts. In particular, courts continue to wrestle
with issues regarding expert reports, including in particular, the impact of
Chapter 74's requirements. Moreover, even with such staid concepts as
relevance, hearsay, and authentication, decisions in this Survey period
highlight the importance of ensuring compliance with the Texas Rules of
Evidence.
170. Id. at 656 (comparing Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 798 (Tex. App.-Waco
1997, no pet.), and Taiwan Shrimp Farm Village Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev.,
Inc., 915 S.W.2d 61, 71 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (holding that the
Property Owner Rule does extend to corporate owners), with Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of
Wichita Falls, 489 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(holding that the rule applies only to natural persons)).
171. Id. at 653.
172. Id. at 658.
173. Id. at 657-58.
174. Id. at 661 n.1.
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